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Abstract: 
Social entrepreneurs increasingly use franchising to scale social value. 
Tracey and Jarvis (2007) described how social franchising is like 
commercially-oriented franchising, but noted critical challenges arising 
from dual goals. We investigate a social franchisor that overcame these 
challenges and describe how the social mission became the source of 
business model innovation. We show that the social mission fostered a 
shared identity that guided the search for adaptations to the franchise 
model. The shared mission-driven identity created pressure toward (1) 
decentralized decision-making, (2) shared governance, and (3) a role for 
the franchisor as orchestrator of collaborative knowledge sharing among 
franchisees.  
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SUCCESSFUL SCALING IN SOCIAL FRANCHISING: 
THE CASE OF IMPACT HUB 
 
 Social entrepreneurs increasingly use franchising to scale social value. Tracey and 
Jarvis (2007) described how social franchising is similar to commercial franchising, but also 
noted critical challenges arising from dual social and commercial goals. We investigate a 
social franchisor that overcame these challenges and describe how the social mission became 
the source of innovation for its business model. We show that the social mission fostered a 
shared identity that motivated and guided the search for adaptations to the franchise model. In 
particular, the shared mission-driven identity created pressure toward (1) decentralized 
decision-making, (2) shared governance, and (3) a new role for the franchisor as orchestrator 
of collaborative knowledge sharing among franchisees. Findings should help social 
franchisors avoid common pitfalls and suggest future research questions for social 
entrepreneurship and franchising scholars. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Interest in social entrepreneurship is rising rapidly, fostered in part by the celebration 
of heroic individuals who are ‘changing the world’ (e.g., Meyskens, Robb-Post, Stamp, 
Carsrud, & Reynolds, 2010). Social entrepreneurs create “social value by providing solutions 
to social problems” (Dacin, Dacin, & Tracey, 2011: 1204) with the primary aim of advancing 
societal well-being (Stephan, Patterson, Kelly, & Mair, 2016). They typically pursue 
strategies that involve revenue-generating activities (Di Domenico, Haugh, & Tracey, 2010) 
and possess a strong desire to spread their solutions widely (Austin, Stevenson, Wei-Skillern, 
2006; Smith, Kistruck, & Cannatelli, 2016). The focus on social value creation, usually 
embedded in an explicit social mission (Stevens, Moray, & Bruneel, 2015), makes social 
entrepreneurship distinct from commercial entrepreneurship in “multiple areas of enterprise 
management and personnel motivation” (Austin et al., 2006: 3).  
Social entrepreneurs have increasingly turned to franchising to scale social solutions 
and replicate success in new locations. Similar to commercial franchising, social franchising 
involves an organization (the social franchisor) allowing others (social franchisees) to offer its 
social solution using its brand name and operational processes in exchange for up-front and 
ongoing fees (cf., Combs, Ketchen, Shook, & Short, 2011). Social franchising is popular as 
evidenced by its widespread use by large social organizations such as Action Aid, The Big 
Issue, E4Impact, the School for Social Entrepreneurs, United Way, the Trussell Trust, and 
YMCA (cf. Oster, 1992; 1996) and dedicated support institutions, including the Social Sector 
Franchising initiative (www.socialsectorfranchising.org) of the International Franchise 
Association in the US, and the International Centre for Social Franchising (renamed ‘Spring 
Impact’ in 2017) in the United Kingdom. 
While scholars have extensively investigated commercial franchising (for reviews, see 
Combs, et al., 2011; Gillis & Castrogiovanni, 2012), theoretical work on social franchising 
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has progressed little since Tracey and Jarvis (2007). They found that, as in commercial 
franchising, access to capital and local expertise motivates social franchisors. However, 
Tracey and Jarvis (2007) also describe how the social mission generated conflicts that 
contributed to the demise of the organization they studied.  
Studying failure is important, but it also raises questions about how so many social 
franchisors successfully scale social value. Past research shows that the scaling up process is 
challenging for social entrepreneurs due to the absence of ‘ready-to-wear’ business models 
(Baden-Fuller & Mangematin, 2013) for reconciling tensions between social and commercial 
goals (Moss, Short, Payne, & Lumpkin, 2010). However, scholars also theorized that these 
tensions might yield unexpected benefits by pushing social entrepreneurs to “engage in active 
integration attempts… to develop more novel and creative social enterprise models” (Wry & 
York, 2017: 453; see also, Battilana, Sengul, Pache, & Model, 2015). The purpose of this 
paper, therefore, is to advance social entrepreneurship research by investigating the role of the 
social mission as a source of innovation in franchising models used to scale social value.  
Our results are based on a 2005-2015 field study of Impact Hub, a global network of 
social business incubators and co-working spaces that adopted franchising in its early years 
but, unlike the case described by Tracey and Jarvis (2007), innovated key elements of its 
business model (e.g., allocation of decision rights, franchisor-franchisee relationship) to 
successfully scale social value.
1
 Our analysis of interviews, direct observation, and archival 
documents confirms Tracey and Jarvis’s (2007) observation that franchisees’ business model 
must be financially and operationally replicable and that achieving balance between social and 
commercial goals is difficult. Moving beyond Tracey and Jarvis (2007), our findings offer 
two contributions. First, our data substantiate and elaborate recent theory suggesting that dual 
social and commercial missions can do more than create tension (Wry & York, 2017); the 
                                                      
1
 We acknowledge, but do not cover in this paper, the fact that in 2015 Impact Hub initiated further 
transformation of its governance (labelled ‘3.0 governance’) wherein transparent accountability based on shared 
measurement systems and protocols for relational norms became progressively more important. 
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social mission generated a shared mission-driven identity that not only motivated stakeholders 
to resolve tensions but also guided adaptations that strengthened Impact Hub’s business 
model. Second, we contribute a description of the specific franchise business model 
adaptations that the shared mission-driven identity created pressure toward – i.e., (1) 
decentralized decision-making, (2) shared governance, and (3) a shift in the franchisor’s role 
toward the orchestration of collaborative knowledge sharing among franchisees (away from 
vertical knowledge transfer).  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The defining characteristic of social entrepreneurship is the entrepreneur’s focus on 
creating value for others rather than capturing it for themselves (Santos, 2012). Over the last 
two decades, research on social entrepreneurship expanded significantly (for a review, see 
Rey-Martí, Ribeiro-Soriano, & Palacios-Marqués, 2016) and scholars widely debated whether 
social entrepreneurship is a distinct area of inquiry from commercial entrepreneurship (cf., 
Nicholls, 2010). There is consensus that socially-oriented contexts introduce important 
differences (e.g., multiple institutional logics, Battilana & Lee, 2014; non-economic 
incentives, Miller, Grimes, McMullen, & Vogus, 2012) that challenge assumptions and 
insights from existing theories about commercial entrepreneurship (Dacin, Dacin, & Matear, 
2010). At the same time, there is recognition that many commercially-oriented organizations 
often seek to create social value (e.g., Austin et al., 2006) and that social entrepreneurs must 
introduce enough commercial-orientation to remain viable (e.g., Smith, Besharov, Wessels, & 
Chertok, 2012). Thus, the distinction between social and commercial entrepreneurship can 
also be “conceptualized as a continuum ranging from purely social to purely economic. Even 
at the extremes… there are still elements of both” (Austin, et al., 2006: 3).  
Some social entrepreneurs devote themselves to serve specific local communities, 
while others feel a moral urgency to scale up their initiatives (Smith et al., 2016) so that their 
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“impact on society becomes wider (i.e., helps more people in more places) and deeper (i.e., 
reduces the problem’s negative effects more dramatically)” (Bloom & Smith, 2010: 127). In 
the scaling process, selecting appropriate business models is critical to ensure that social 
organizations “resist pressures to ‘drift’ toward either social or economic objectives at the 
expense of the other” (Battilana & Lee, 2014: 419). In recent years, social franchising has 
become very popular as a model for dealing with these challenges (e.g., Bruder, 2013), but 
research is still limited and relies mainly on theory adapted from commercial franchising (e.g., 
Oster, 1992; 1996). We review these theoretical foundations briefly in the next sections. Table 
1 summarizes research on commercial and social franchisors.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
Research on commercially-oriented franchises 
Much of the research investigating franchising attempts to explain why and under 
what conditions franchisors use franchisees rather than building and managing outlets through 
the corporate hierarchy. The first explanation was resource scarcity, which predicts that 
entrepreneurs franchise in response to pressure to achieve economies of scale faster than 
available resources would otherwise permit (Oxenfeld & Kelly, 1969). An entrepreneur with a 
locally successful business model can grow quickly with fewer resources because franchisees 
invest their own capital and labor (Castrogiovanni, Combs, & Justis, 2006).  
The second more dominant explanation, agency theory, predicts that franchisors use 
franchising in situations where the costs of monitoring local employee-managers is high 
compared to the cost of using franchisees (Gillis & Castrogiovanni, 2012). Such costs are 
higher, for example, when outlets are geographically dispersed (Perryman & Combs, 2012), in 
unfamiliar markets (Fladmoe-Lindquist & Jacque, 1995), or too small to monitor efficiently 
(Lafontaine, 1992). Franchisees are less expensive because their invested labor and capital 
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gives them a strong incentive to work hard to maximize outlet profits (Rubin, 1978), but 
franchisees might do so in ways that do not benefit the franchisor or other outlets in the 
system. Franchisees might, for example, boost profits by reducing quality (Jin & Leslie, 
2009), refusing to participate in promotions (i.e., “participation may vary”), or failing to 
upgrade facilities (Bradach, 1997; Kidwell, Nygaard, & Silkoset, 2007). These actions harm 
the brand’s overall image (Michael, 2000) and result in less franchising (relative to corporate 
ownership) when a standardized brand image is important (Lafontaine & Shaw, 2005). 
Other research focuses on structural and social relationships between franchisees and 
the franchisor. Structurally, franchise business models differ according to whether customers 
rely on the brand to signal a common experience, which requires franchisors to centralize 
decision making and put systems in place to maximize standardization (Bradach, 1997; Ater 
& Rigbi, 2015), resulting in what Castrogiovanni and Justis (1998) call a “carbon copy” form. 
In situations where customers do not travel, a physical product is involved, or service delivery 
is complex (Mumdžiev & Windsperger, 2011), decisions can be decentralized to franchisees 
resulting in a “confederation form” (Castrogiovanni & Justis, 1998). Franchise systems also 
change and evolve over time. Young franchisors often have under-developed franchisee 
support but develop training, communication systems, and centralized support as they grow 
(Shane, 2001). Finally, franchise systems change when franchisees develop new process and 
product innovations that the franchisor learns about and implements system-wide (Bradach, 
1997; Darr, Argote, & Epple, 1995; Kaufmann & Eroglu, 1999). 
Research also describes how the social relationship between franchisees and the 
franchisor affect important outcomes. Relational norms such as trust (Chiou, Hsieh, & Yang, 
2004), communication (Meek, Davis-Sramek, Baucus, & Germain, 2011), and cohesion (El 
Akremi, Mignonac, & Perrigot, 2010) have been tied to outcomes such as franchisee 
satisfaction, commitment, and compliance. The social relationship appears particularly 
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important when franchisees have greater autonomy (Cochet, Dormann, & Ehrmann, 2008). 
Indeed, when relational norms break down, franchisees often join (adversarial) independent 
associations to counterbalance the franchisor’s power (Lawrence & Kaufmann, 2011).  
Overall, research focused on commercial franchising describes multiple reasons why 
franchising is used over company ownership and points to important differences among 
franchisors regarding key business model elements, such as the level of franchisee autonomy 
and the nature of the relationship between the franchisor and franchisees.  
Scaling social value through (social) franchising 
Social franchising is definitionally the same as commercial franchising in that it 
involves a contractual arrangement wherein a brand name and operational support are offered 
to local franchisees in exchange for up-front fees (usually) and on-going royalties/fees 
(Combs et al., 2011; Tracey & Jarvis, 2007). As in social entrepreneurship more generally, it 
differs in that social value creation is more important relative to financial value capture (cf., 
Kistruck, Webb, Sutter, & Ireland, 2011). Franchising is attractive for social organizations 
because it promises an efficient and sustainable business model to spread social solutions. It is 
also attractive for local social entrepreneurs because it provides a structured way to solve a 
local social problem and offers an opportunity to become part of a larger socially-oriented 
community. Despite its attractiveness, however, social franchising appears more challenging 
in practice than what is suggested by its appearance as a ‘ready-to-wear’ business model.  
Although scholarly research is limited, two kinds of social franchises can be identified. 
First, micro-franchising involves the use of franchising to generate social benefits in base-of-
the-pyramid markets by giving beneficiaries job opportunities as franchisees (Alon, 2014; 
Christensen, Parson, & Fairbourne, 2010). The Big Issue (www.bigissue.com), for instance, 
uses micro-franchising to provide job opportunities to homeless people in the UK. Once 
vetted, homeless people are authorized to sell ‘The Big Issue’ magazine. They buy copies 
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upfront from the franchisor and retain all profit from sales. Recognizing challenges that like-
for-like adoption of commercial franchising entails in such contexts, Kistruck et al. (2011) 
suggested certain business model adaptations. They stressed the need to give micro-
franchisees more flexibility to tailor offerings to local conditions and advocated for a more 
consultative franchisor role. Micro-franchising, however, involves a very close overlap 
between franchisees and the beneficiaries of the intended social impact.  
Tracey and Jarvis (2007) investigated a second type of franchising wherein franchisees 
are geographically dispersed social organizations that, in turn, deliver social value to 
beneficiaries. They investigated Aspire, a UK-based organization that partnered with local 
non-profit franchisees to provide employment for homeless beneficiaries. They found 
similarities with commercial franchises in that Aspire tried to overcome resource scarcities 
that might have otherwise hindered growth. However, contrary to agency theory’s prediction 
that the best franchisees will self-select and self-monitor (Rubin, 1978; Shane, 1996), they 
found that Aspire incurred higher selection and monitoring costs because franchisees’ goals 
diverged from its own by over-emphasizing the social mission at the expense of economic 
sustainability. More recently, scholars used the Aspire case to show how the social mission 
made it easier to overlook franchisee-agents’ competence and removed economic incentives 
as an effective motivational tool, creating “stewardship costs” (Krzeminska & Zeyen, 2017).  
The Aspire case provides important foundations for understanding what makes social 
franchising challenging, but its failure does not explain the many successful examples found 
in practice. The Trussell Trust (www.trusselltrust.org), for instance, uses franchising to 
manage 400 foodbanks across the UK. In 2016, it provided nearly 1.2 million three-day 
emergency food packages to end-beneficiaries. E4Impact (www.e4impact.org) delivers 
higher-education programs for social entrepreneurs in several Sub-Saharan African countries 
through a system of university partners serving as local franchisees. To date, it has trained 
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around 650 social entrepreneurs across seven countries, supporting the creation of nearly 
3,500 jobs with impact on over 180,000 end-beneficiaries. Thus, while social 
entrepreneurship research points to a general need for business model adaptation to reconcile 
social and commercial goals (e.g., Wry & York, 2017), franchising remains under-theorized 
and lacks empirical evidence about the types of adaptations that might work.  
METHOD 
To illuminate successful adaptations in the social franchise context, we conducted a 
qualitative field-study, which is fitting due to the early stage of theory development (cf. Gioia, 
Corley, & Hamilton, 2013). We studied Impact Hub, the largest global network of business 
incubators and co-working spaces devoted to socially-oriented organizations. The social 
mission of Impact Hub is “to support enterprising initiatives for a better world by growing a 
locally rooted, globally connected community for measurable positive impact. [It] seeks to 
inspire, connect, and enable people to take entrepreneurial action in order to pioneer a just 
and sustainable world where business and profit are used in service of people and planet” 
(Impact Hub, Article of Associations 2.1). Tenants incubating at Impact Hubs are mostly 
individuals or organizations that themselves have a social mission. Our analysis focuses on 
2005 to 2015 when, similar to Tracey and Jarvis (2007), Impact Hub experienced notable 
growth and turbulence. Contrary to their case, however, Impact Hub did not collapse but 
innovated its business model with adaptations to accommodate its dual social and commercial 
goals.  
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Data Collection 
Data collection spanned eight years, with primary data collection from 2011 through 
2015 and confirmatory follow-ups in 2017 and 2018. As summarized in Table 2, we 
conducted 33 interviews, participated in more than a dozen events, engaged in field visits to 
multiple countries, and attended the global gathering in 2015. In the first data collection 
round, we selected interviewees through personal connections with our local hub manager, 
and then used referrals to connect with additional hub managers. In the second round, we 
obtained endorsement from Impact Hub’s senior actors who provided additional contacts. One 
researcher conducted first round interviews, and another conducted the remaining rounds.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
We fully briefed all informants about the academic nature of the research and 
reassured them that their personal names and business names would be anonymized to 
encourage full information sharing. The questions we asked were initially exploratory—e.g., 
“What is the relationship between your hub and other hubs in the network?” As we compared 
emerging evidence with the literature (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014), the questions 
evolved into semi-structured interviews with an increased focus on franchisee-franchisor and 
cross-hub relationships—e.g., “How did governance work when your hub was launched? 
What were the terms of agreement, and how did they evolve over time?” Given our reliance on 
retrospective interviews, we proactively counterbalanced risks of recall bias by triangulating 
evidence with other data sources, including archival material, but mostly direct observation 
and experience. These activities allowed us “to gain first hand exposure to the processes under 
study, instead of solely relying on interviewee accounts” (Danneels, 2002: 1098). 
Data Analysis 
Our data analysis followed analytical procedures set out by Gioia et al. (2013). We 
followed three key steps to make sure that empirical observations were “connected to extant 
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theoretical ideas to generate novel conceptual insight and distinctions” (Langley, Smallman, 
Tsoukas, & Van de Ven, 2013: 11). This analytical process requires researchers to 
systematically examine competing theoretical explanations in light of emerging empirical 
evidence. Figure 1 presents our final coding structure. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
Step 1. Event-history analysis and open coding. We started by creating a database based on 
the chronology of our material and field notes. This step was useful to make sense of our 
material and to reconstruct the history of Impact Hub. After each interview round, we engaged 
in a process of ‘open-coding’ (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) wherein we read the transcripts line-
by-line and created a dataset of codes using words or short phrases summarizing the meaning 
of different parts of text (i.e., ‘in-vivo’ codes; cf. Gioia et al., 2013). For example, we used the 
code ‘identity’ to summarize ‘it is [Impact Hub’s] DNA, there is a common cause, common 
identity’. Next, we consolidated redundancies and defined our first-order categories so that 
they reflect our informants’ ‘concepts-in-use’ (Gephart, 2004). For example, in-vivo codes 
such as ‘falling in love with the founder’s idea’ and ‘being inspired to launch a new hub after 
meeting the founder’ were consolidated into the first-order code ‘inspiring others to join’.  
Step 2. Axial coding. We coded the data via several cycles of comparisons between data and 
theory, acting as ‘knowledgeable agents’ (Gioia et al., 2013) to interpret evidence. We 
initially grouped first-order categories according to areas of prior research on social 
entrepreneurship (e.g., ‘following the mission as the authority’), business models (e.g., 
‘creating an inverted power structure’), and social movements (e.g., ‘offering the opportunity 
to be part of a global network of ‘impact-makers’). We also distinguished data as being 
related to either the franchisor or franchisees. We then grouped conceptually overlapping first-
order categories into second-order themes (Gioia, et al. 2013). Finally, two authors read the 
Page 11 of 44 Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
12 
 
evidence independently and worked closely comparing and discussing their coding structures. 
This effort teased out some factors seemingly central in the challenges experienced by Impact 
Hub. Pressures on the franchisor’s business model from conflict between franchisor and 
franchisee expectations were particularly evident.  
Step 3. Generating propositions. In the last step, we compared our second-order themes with 
theoretical predictions and insights in extant literature. That is, “to develop and contextualize 
our findings theoretically” (Tracey & Jarvis, 2007: 673), we asked how our emerging theory 
was similar or different from prior social entrepreneurship and franchising research. We 
repeated this process until we were able to aggregate our second-order themes into stable 
aggregate dimensions reflecting an even higher degree of abstraction. “Social mission as a 
source of franchise model innovation” and “mission-driven identity adaptations to social 
franchise model” were the final aggregate dimensions used to derive our propositions. To 
check the ‘trustworthiness’ (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) of our work during the data collection, 
we regularly discussed emerging findings with key informants.  
RESEARCH SETTING: SOCIAL FRANCHISING AT IMPACT HUB 
Impact Hub is a global network of organizations that provides a mix of co-working 
spaces and incubation services mostly to socially-oriented organizations and individuals 
(called “members”). At the time of final writing, Impact Hub had 103 hubs in six continents 
with over 16,000 members (for detailed narratives, see Bachmann, 2014, and Watson, 2015).  
‘The Hub’ (renamed ‘Impact Hub’ after a 2013 trademark dispute) was launched in 
London, UK in 2005 by a group of students with experience in international NGOs and UN 
agencies. It was informally led by Jonathan Robinson, a young anthropology graduate. 
Between 2005 and 2007, with funding provided by impact investors, Robinson and colleagues 
ran the first hub in a 3,230-squarefoot space on the top floor of an old warehouse in London’s 
Islington district. The business model was membership-based and rather simple, revolving 
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around a mix of co-working space rental, event organizing, and member-led business clinics. 
Members paid a fee based on the amount of time and space they needed. In 2008, following 
the opening of nine new locations around the world, Impact Hub adopted franchising. This 
decision had been inspired by the Body Shop’s franchise, since one of the early investors was 
Gordon Roddick, co-founder of the Body Shop. According to one informant (Hub #7a), “[The 
team was] very much influenced by… a group of visionary people who had founded the Big 
Issue and the Body Shop… [Impact Hub] was conceived… with a model that blended business 
and social aspects… a sort of micro Body Shop, with a profit entity at its centre.” The 
franchisor became a limited liability company called Hub World owned by Robinson. By 
2010, Impact Hubs were in 27 cities worldwide with a long list of prospective applicants.  
This rapid growth, however, brought significant organizational challenges due to 
rising divergence between the way the franchisor and franchisees envisioned the evolution of 
Impact Hub’s business model. We investigated these challenges and the subsequent changes 
in Impact Hub’s business model. Remarkably, Impact Hub did not collapse but managed to 
re-organize and sustain its growth trajectory. Key milestones are summarized in Figure 2.  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
FINDINGS 
Our purpose is to use the Impact Hub case to learn about the different ways that the 
social mission affects successful adaptation of the franchising business model. The findings 
are organized in two sections according to the coding structure in Figure 1. Overall, we found 
six second-order themes that we grouped under two aggregate dimensions. The first aggregate 
dimension describes how Impact Hub’s social mission fostered a shared identity that became 
the source of motivation for stakeholders to come together and search for innovative ways to 
adapt the franchise business model to better accommodate competing financial and social 
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pressures. The second describes how this mission-driven identity fostered specific and 
ultimately more successful business model adaptations.  
After describing the evidence supporting each aggregate dimension, we compare the 
case with prior research on franchising and advance propositions regarding the role of the 
social mission in a) sparking the search for business model innovation and b) guiding the 
successful adaptations that Impact Hub adopted. Table 3 summarizes key implications of the 
social mission among more commercially- and more socially-oriented franchises.  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
Social mission as a source of franchise business model innovation 
While the business model for franchisees was fairly clear, simple, and replicable, 
Impact Hub faced several challenges as a franchisor as it worked to establish a business model 
that was both financially sound and capable of scaling social value.  
Attractive vision for social change. The vision of Robinson and his co-founders was to 
gather early-stage and aspiring social entrepreneurs to create a community of likeminded 
people with the drive to create social value and positively impact their local communities – so 
called ‘impact-makers.’ The first hub in London had few plans to expand geographically but 
the value proposition proved to be attractive for people who sought to be part of something 
larger and wanted to replicate the approach. “People start coming in asking how they could 
make a hub in their own countries, and they started opening hubs here and there…” (Hub #6 
[interviewee numbers were randomly assigned]). “We all were looking for ways to have a 
social impact,” another newcomer (Hub #12) observed, “We were all attracted to the idea of 
not just starting a business, but of uniting and enabling others to have an impact.” Most of 
these people already knew one another through participation in other international student 
networks and had experience working in international NGOs or government agencies. 
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At the time, Robinson travelled extensively, inspiring others to join. “Immediately 
when I met him, I felt in love with him, with the idea, with the legend and the story of the 
Hub,” remembered an early (local Hub) founder (Hub #18). His approach was captivating, 
and he was granting the license to the brand in an informal way. “We started very much in 
friendship,” another informant (Hub #1) who joined in that period pointed out, “We ended up 
signing an agreement… to demonstrate that we were part of a global world… more like a 
commitment fee”. The original agreement required a licensing fee to use the brand name but 
had no other particular requirements. In 2007, the founding team received over one hundred 
requests to replicate hubs in other cities and, by 2008, nine new hubs were established.  
The attractiveness of the vision generated significant challenges because “the bottom-
up pull was so strong that London did not have the capacity to direct [the process],” argued 
one informant (Hub #10). The need for a more robust business model that could sustain 
growth became evident. At a lively meeting in Belgium in 2008, a franchising structure was 
agreed upon that required a £30,000 franchising fee plus an 8% royalty fee on revenue. The 
newly created franchisor, Hub World, was controlled by Robinson and tasked with providing 
services such as consulting on new hub openings and supporting shared IT. The original plan 
was to transfer equal shares of Hub World to each local hub and introduce more decentralized 
decision-making. “People bought into the concept of the central organization [to be] 
implemented as a social franchise with a legal franchise agreement but run very much as a 
large partnership” (Hub #8).” “We constantly had to innovate… innovation was both a need 
and an inherent motivation to co-create something together worth doing,” argued another: 
“Unlike the [commercial] franchise approach… we were driven by purpose and by the ability 
to respond to societal goals: we had to seek a form to support that” (Hub #1). 
When we compare our second-order theme attractive vision for social change with 
franchising research and Tracey and Jarvis’s (2007) failed social franchise case, we see an 
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attractive social vision as a necessary but not sufficient condition for scaling social value 
through franchising. In both cases, franchisees were attracted to the social vision and it is 
difficult to imagine their achieving similar growth without attractive social visions. While 
commercial franchisees might also be attracted to the franchisor’s corporate social 
responsibility profile, more commercially-oriented franchisees are unlikely to give up a 
significant portion of their return on capital and labor in exchange for the privilege of being 
involved in social value creation (cf. Shane, 1996). However, an attractive vision for social 
change is not sufficient. As in commercial franchising, successful geographic expansion 
depends on the presence of a business model that can be replicated and that delivers sufficient 
economic returns to attract and retain good franchisees (Combs et al., 2011). A major reason 
for the collapse of the social franchise described by Tracey and Jarvis (2007) was that the 
franchisees’ business model – i.e., employing the homeless in catalog distribution and order 
fulfillment – while attractive, proved too difficult for franchisees to replicate. Impact Hub 
went through similar challenges. “[Impact Hub] attracted amazing people… In anything to do 
with social entrepreneurship… there is the sense of the vision of what is possible which 
attracts people and brings people together… but then there is the functionality of making it 
actually work… if you cannot sustain yourself, then you are gone and so goes the social 
mission” (Hub #1). Accordingly, scaling social value through franchising appears to require 
both a replicable and financially stable franchisee business model and an attractive vision for 
social change that draws franchisees in (and thus generates growth).  
Proposition 1a:  Successfully scaling social value through social franchising requires 
both a financially stable and replicable business model and an attractive vision for 
social change. 
 
Struggle with the franchisor’s model. The adoption of a model that mirrored 
commercial franchising yet with a social mission did not reduce turbulence among 
stakeholders. Tensions rose once again for three main reasons. First, the transfer of shares to 
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franchisees was never implemented, leaving Robinson as the sole shareholder and creating a 
decision-making bottleneck. This “led to a quite conflictual period” (Hub #11). Second, the 
operational support provided by Hub World did not improve sufficiently and franchisees 
started questioning the value received for the money. “[They were saying], understandably to 
me, ‘I am paying a chunk of money to this central organization for support and so on… what 
value is it providing to me?’” (Hub #8). Third, the terms of the franchising agreement were 
problematic because the hefty financial conditions and limited support hindered local 
franchisees who struggled to cover royalty payments. “It was a cascade system…” because 
paying Hub World high fees forced franchisees to charge their local members more and “this 
created very high entry barriers [to attract paying members]” (Hub #10).  
The situation degenerated quickly because Hub World was increasingly under pressure 
from its investors and had to chase fees from local hubs to stay alive. One informant (Hub 
#7a) remembered that “[Robinson] had likely negotiated a certain return on investment with 
[investors]… and was meeting people around the world to collect promises from prospective 
founders [to show investors.].” “[Jonathan] was telling a story: ‘let’s make the world better, 
but then give me the money’… People could see that these two things were in conflict… 
[some] felt that Hub World was like ‘a mother eating her own children’” (Hub HQ). Some 
franchisees – particularly those who did not attend the meeting in Belgium – stopped paying 
their royalties, adding pressure on Hub World. At the beginning of 2010, all those involved 
had “to acknowledge that the system did not work anymore” (Hub #15).  
In February 2010, around 50 people gathered in Amsterdam to discuss the challenges 
surrounding the franchisor’s business model. Robinson and his team faced difficult questions 
from Hub World investors and franchisees about strategy, leadership, and budget. Attendees 
recalled heated discussions. There was general recognition of the need for change but little 
agreement on what to do. “We’d been very excited about what we want to do, but did we 
Page 17 of 44 Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
18 
 
really want to fight for a better model? …We needed it, but there was no model” (Hub #6). 
The meeting became a watershed moment with a real chance that the franchise would disband. 
Investors who had provided funding to Robinson in previous years were demanding rights to 
the brand and repayment of their money, and some franchisees decided to abandon Impact 
Hub. In the end, most participants decided to establish a working group with key stakeholder 
representatives to explore and propose a new business model. 
 In March and April 2010, the working group benchmarked organizations perceived as 
similar – e.g., AIESEC (aiesec.org) and the Swedish Natural Step (www.thenaturalstep.org) – 
and proposed a novel business model called the ‘Volcano Model’ because of its bottom-up 
governance structure . This model was then extensively discussed and modified before being 
approved in early 2011. In the meantime, for nearly a year, the Hub World franchisor was left 
running at limited capacity and did not experience significant growth. The final approved 
business model created a new central organization – ‘Hub Association’ – in the form of a non-
profit entity collectively co-owned by all local hubs as equal shareholders. Impact Hub was 
“effectively, still following the social franchising model” (member of the global management 
team, Hub HQ) (cf., Watson, 2015); each local hub paid a franchising fee and a royalty on 
revenues, albeit much less than before at €15,000 and 2.5%, respectively.  
In comparing the second-order theme struggle with the franchisor’s model to research 
on commercial franchising, we see important commonalities between commercial and social 
franchising. While commercial franchisees have less commitment to a social mission, they are 
both financially and personally (through their labor – Norton, 1988) committed to the brand 
and identify deeply with it (Lawrence & Kaufmann, 2011). Thus, when franchisors fail to 
provide adequate support (e.g., Shane, 2001) or take actions that franchisees believe threaten 
their livelihood (Cochet & Ehrmann, 2007), for example, by offering pricing discounts that 
generate royalty revenue for the franchisor but harm franchisees (Lafontaine, 1999), angry 
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franchisees band together to call for change, often through independent associations 
(Lawrence & Kaufmann, 2010). High royalties and inadequate support similarly angered 
Impact Hub’s franchisees and, just as commercial franchisees’ anger is heightened by their 
strong brand identification (Lawrence & Kaufmann 2011), social franchisees’ anger is 
heightened by their sense of injustice with respect to their commitment to the social mission.  
What made Impact Hub different is that franchisees stayed committed because they 
‘believed’ in the social mission and were “neither willing to abandon it nor to let financial 
considerations take over without a counterproposal” (Hub #7a). Further, rather than taking an 
adversarial stance, key stakeholders – i.e., investors and franchisees – shared a commitment to 
the social mission that led to a process wherein they engaged in “multiple and progressively 
more creative integration attempts” to generate a novel business model that successfully 
integrates social and commercial goals (Wry & York, 2017: 451). The shared mission created 
a bond among Impact Hub’s stakeholders that motivated them to work through the challenges 
and find adaptations to the business model to overcome the problems they confronted:  
Proposition 1b: The more important the franchisor’s social mission, the more it 
creates pressure to engage in business model innovation to resolve tensions between 
social and financial goals.  
 
 Finally, the aggregate dimension social mission as a source of franchise model 
innovation sees the mission-driven identity as a guide for business model innovations that 
reconcile social and commercial goals (see Figure 1). Facing the collapse of the franchise, 
franchisees came together around what united them in the first place: their mission-driven 
identity. “Those were challenging times because it comes back to identity… If we did not 
believe in the social mission, we would not have continued through those crazy times…” (Hub 
#1). Reflecting on the change process, one informant (Hub #20) told us in mid-2011: “Right 
now, it is a matter of identity: What makes Impact Hub? Who are we, and who do we want to 
be?” “In our core DNA there is a common cause, a common identity” argued another: “what 
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is really ‘becoming’ a global network is its strong identity and links between the hubs” (Hub 
#19). One of the informants (Hub #20) stressed that the fundamental question in 2010 was: 
“‘what is the authority’? In a [traditional] franchise, the authority is the franchisor. Right 
now, our authority is our vision which we can refer to when we discuss what should be the 
specifications and what makes the Hub.” Hub Association was created at the center of this 
revised business model to align franchisees around Impact Hub’s social mission. “What we 
have done is to elevate shared purposes, shared principles, and shared values… with the 
intent to hold each other to account” (Hub HQ).  
 The mission-driven social identity also included a sense of being part of a broader 
community. “[It is like] belonging to something larger than yourself…,” argued one 
informant: “When you walk [into a hub] and say ‘I’m a Hubber’, people will immediately be 
very welcoming to you, very friendly, and happy to share or help” (Hub #6). At first, we 
found the description of this community feeling difficult-to-accept, but we experienced it 
ourselves over several interactions we had with local hubs. For example, while collecting data 
for another project in May 2016, one author attended an event unannounced at an Impact Hub 
in Africa where he was met with some suspicion at the door. As soon as he told the host – 
who happened to be the local founder – that he was a member of another hub, the host greeted 
him warmly with a big hug and exclaimed: “Welcome, my friend: You’re family!” 
Our data suggest that a mission-driven identity becomes more important and central as 
among more socially-oriented franchisors. This is conceptualized in the second-order theme 
‘mission-driven identity as innovation guide’. While commercial franchisees also form deep 
social identities (Lawrence & Kaufmann, 2011) and perceptions of cohesion can reduce free 
riding (El Akrimi, Mignonac, & Perrogot, 2010), research suggests that these social forms of 
motivation or “clan control” are secondary to “output controls” (Eisenhard, 1989; Ouchi, 
1980) based on profits (Combs et al., 2011). Even when franchisors decentralize most key 
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decisions, it is done for economic reasons – i.e., because service delivery is complex and/or 
requires local adaptation – not (primarily) because a shared mission motivates and directs 
franchisees’ behavior – and franchisees are motivated to perform in these decentralized 
franchises (e.g., real estate) because of their economic (output) incentives (Rubin, 1978).  
Consistent with Tracey and Jarvis (2007), our data suggest that economic incentives 
are a less effective source of motivation among socially-oriented franchisees because their 
ultimate purpose is to implement effective social solutions (cf., Krzeminska & Zeyen, 2017). 
While economic incentives were certainly important – the franchisees could not perform their 
social mission while paying high royalties – our evidence suggests that Impact Hub 
franchisees joined because they believed in its social mission and that their loyalty to the 
shared identity was an important mechanism holding them together during turbulent times. In 
this respect, the revised and less hefty financial arrangement was perceived as less relevant 
than other changes designed “precisely to avoid putting such a profit-led mechanism at the 
core of a network whose vision was to support social entrepreneurship” (Hub #7a). Tracey 
and Jarvis hinted at the importance of this “shared identity and sense of purpose that 
characterized early franchise interactions” (Tracey & Jarvis, 2007: 679). Research argues that 
an organization’s identity “acts as a guidepost for organizational action [and] influences 
which organizational activities are pursued” (Anthony & Tripsas, 2016: 417-418). Our data 
suggests that the specific franchise business model adaptations Impact Hub adopted 
(described below) were both stimulated and made possible by the organization’s strong shared 
mission-driven identity. We thus formalize our third proposition:  
Proposition 1c: The more important the social mission, the more adaptations to the 
franchise business model leverage the motivation provided by a shared social mission-
driven identity.  
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Mission-driven identity adaptations to the franchise business model 
Having a mission-driven identity has been identified as a common and important 
element in social entrepreneurship outside of the franchising context (e.g., Battilana & Lee, 
2014). Our data suggest that this shared identity guided the model in particular ways with 
respect to decision-making, governance, and network leadership, as conceptualized in the next 
set of three second-order themes.  
Decentralized decision-making. At the meeting in Amsterdam, strong demand for 
more democratic and fairer management emerged: “We want to share value; we don’t want to 
be ‘adapted’ from a central organization that captures value from the local organizations.” 
(Hub #8). There was a desire to “go back to the original idea of decentralizing power to local 
hubs, with a democratic, open process” (Hub #3).  
Importantly, the desire for decentralization and local control was a direct expression of 
the shared mission-driven identity. “People wanted to be driving this [social mission] 
themselves” (Hub #11). Franchisees sought a horizontal redistribution of responsibilities “so 
that each of us could add [social mission] value to the network” and “so that the contribution 
of local hubs to supporting new openings could be recognized” (Hub #10). “We were pushing 
for decentralized decision-making… [but] If we had just decided to decentralize, we would 
have become a loose network… but we valued [what we called] ‘value-creating coherence’… 
that’s where the Volcano model came out of” (Hub #1). “There isn’t a magic wand to manage 
a global network… a confederation where power is diffused among the nodes… the center 
dilutes its power every time a new hub joins… but it is a necessary journey of participation to 
strengthen the [social mission-driven] identity of the network” (Hub #7a). 
The new decentralized franchising structure re-initiated growth because it improved 
the adaptability of the business model to a wider variety of local conditions. Impact Hub was 
on a trajectory to become “a global network yet very much contextualized in each country” 
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(Hub #10). “We started something which is locally rooted and international connected,” one 
franchisee (Hub #1) argued; “[We] call it translocality: it means being able to co-create 
something new with your own uniqueness [based on the global model].” The implementation 
of the general franchising model to the local context required franchisees “to get into the core 
of the understanding of the mind-set of local people, how they look at business [in the local 
community]” (Hub #2). After years of turbulence in its governance, all franchisees were fully 
autonomous, but all aligned around the same mission-driven identity. “We want to go in the 
same direction and create a space for people who have ideas for a better world… We have, 
however, the same vision which is adapted differently country by country” (Hub #1).  
More commercially-o iented franchisors also sometimes decentralize extensively but 
for different reasons. When customers are mobile and expect the same service quality at each 
outlet, commercial franchisors typically control all core decisions (Kaufmann & Eroglu, 1999) 
and only give franchisees a limited range of control over decisions that require local decision-
making, such as staffing (Mumdžiev & Windsperger, 2011) and pricing (Lafontaine, 1999). 
However, when the service is complex (e.g., real estate), customers are not particularly mobile 
(e.g., fitness centers), and in product license franchising (e.g., autos and gasoline), franchisees 
are often given considerable latitude to select and design facilities and tailor offerings to local 
clients’ needs (Castrogiovanni & Justis, 1998; Mumdžiev & Windsperger, 2011).  
Our data show that the social mission is an additional factor that facilitated 
decentralization at Impact Hub. Decentralized decision-making at Impact Hub was made 
possible in part by some of the same practical reasons found among more commercially-
oriented franchisors – i.e., service delivery is complex, local needs are important, and Impact 
Hub’s members rarely travel to or expect identical services from other hubs. However, the 
shared mission-driven identity also played a role in facilitating decentralization in that the 
franchisor and other franchisees could trust that everyone would work hard to fulfill the 
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organization’s mission. Commercially-oriented franchisees will also work hard without direct 
supervision, but their motivation is to maximize local profits (Lafontaine, 1992; Shane, 1996), 
and they sometimes do so by “free-riding” on the brand’s reputation (Kidwell, et al., 2007; 
Rubin, 1978). Free riding was less of a problem in our data because franchisees’ central 
motivation came from their shared identity, which made it possible to decentralize without 
developing extensive procedures to monitor and correct franchisee behavior. “There really 
wasn’t any quality monitoring… because we trusted each other” (Hub #1). Stated formally:  
Proposition 2a: The more important the social mission, the more a shared mission-
driven identity among franchisees drives the business model toward decentralized 
decision-making.   
 
Shared governance. The new business model also included a substantial governance 
change with the creation of a new non-profit central organization – ‘Hub Association’ – that 
was collectively co-owned by all local hubs as equal shareholders. “That’s our call, this is 
why we see ourselves as a network of peers with no central entities controlling us.” (Hub #9). 
The application process for new prospective franchisees, for example, now required 
recommendation letters from two existing hubs before being presented to the general 
assembly. Impact Hub now had “a model which is community-driven, it is run from the 
ground-up, and it is open to deviations… as long as they are embraced by the community” 
(Hub #12). When we attended the global gathering in 2015, we collected first-hand evidence 
of how this push toward shared governance had been incorporated into the contractual 
agreement with members, for example, by detailing how hubs were to measure social impact 
and common rules for, among other things, using the brand and logo, managing partnerships 
and new members, and building relationships between hubs.  
We asked direct questions about the relationship between the social mission and 
governance changes and found evidence that the social mission-driven identity both 
influenced the desire for shared governance and made such governance possible. “[One 
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reason why commercial] franchising did not work was… that value creation was not coming 
from one central body, it was coming from the edges which is in line with our [social] 
mission… You can’t sell something [to franchisees] based on collaboration and not make the 
[governance] model collaborative” The social mission became how franchisees were held 
accountable: “More and more people [were saying] ‘how do we hold each other 
accountable?’ …You need, for a lack of a better word, not legal contracts, but social 
[mission] contracts… In [commercial] franchises you can pull a franchisee away much more 
easily… it was very important to differentiate [our model] from commercial franchise” (Hub 
#1). “That is why we started a transition where every Hub is an equal partner” (Hub #8).  
Franchisees also have a governance role in more commercially-oriented franchises. 
Early franchisees are often personally recruited by the founder, have direct communication 
with the founder, and feel like members of a family with a shared identity (Lawrence and 
Kaufmann, 2011). Larger franchisors often develop franchise councils comprised of selected 
franchisees who advised the franchisor on key decisions, and when there is conflict, 
independent franchise associations form to air grievances and negotiate with the franchisor 
(Lawrence and Kaufmann, 2010). Our data suggest, however, that as the social mission 
becomes relatively more important, it adds pressure toward adaptations that allow all 
stakeholders – including franchisees – to be more involved in organization-wide decisions. 
Prior research suggests that social organizations spend “considerable time, energy and other 
resources discussing and modifying their governance structures” (Widmer & Houchin, 1999: 
34) to minimize the risks of mission drift (Santos, Pache, & Birkholz, 2015) and to strike a 
balance “between the need for greater efficiency and centralization and the need for 
representation” (Cornforth, 2012: 14, emphasis in the original). Our data suggest that, at least 
in the social franchising context, the social mission-driven identity increases bottom-up 
pressure for representation and thus more collaborative ownership structures. More formally:  
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Proposition 2b: The more important the social mission, the more a shared mission-
driven identity among franchisees creates pressure toward shared governance. 
 
Franchisor as the ‘orchestrator’ of collaborative knowledge sharing. The new Impact 
Hub franchisor (Hub Association) was given a new role as orchestrator of conversation and 
collaboration among hubs: “We put a lot of effort in building the infrastructure… to get more 
effective relationships between the various hubs” (Hub #11). Franchisees obtained more 
freedom in the new business model. Although collaborative knowledge sharing had always 
been central for Impact Hub, the franchisor was now specifically responsible for “gathering 
and sharing knowledge to support the whole network through training, networking 
opportunities, and access to specific technologies” (Hub #12). This more supporting role 
improved knowledge dynamics because franchisees felt “like partners working together 
rather than franchisees that are following instructions from the center… the relationship with 
[Hub Association] has been one of support, encouragement, advice, rather than instruction 
and insistence” (Hub #11). They welcomed sharing knowledge with others because they were 
“in a co-creating relationship with others for a shared purpose” (Hub #1), and because 
“Impact Hub is a value-based system where there is collaboration among people and 
entities” (Hub #5). Nonetheless, the franchisor maintained an important coordination and 
monitoring function. For example, Watson (2015) reported in the Financial Times that the 
franchisor had to find ways to control the risk of “local hub entrepreneurs selling out their 
stake to others who might not share the group’s social business agenda.”  
As with decentralization and shared governance, the shared mission-driven identity 
both supports and helps make the franchisor’s new role possible. Fostering knowledge sharing 
is easier and more effective “if the center diffuses principles and values, rather than systems” 
(Hub #6). “Our most important values are trust, collaboration, and community… Every year 
we meet twice for the strategy gathering and the practice gathering… we definitely get 
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benefits in network collaboration… [if we need help] we can reach out to [Hub Association] 
and there is a lot of open trust, sharing and collaboration… that’s amazing!” (Hub #6). 
In comparing this final second-order theme – orchestrator of collaborative knowledge 
sharing – with research focused on more commercially-oriented franchisors, we found that the 
mission-driven identity guides more socially-oriented franchisors a different leadership role 
with respect to knowledge dynamics. Horizontal knowledge flows among franchisees can be 
important in commercial settings. Darr et al. (1995), for example, show how a pizza chain’s 
franchisee innovated operational solutions that spread first to the franchisee’s other outlets, 
then to nearby franchisees, and then to others through regional franchisee gatherings. 
Castrogiovanni and Justis (1998) describe some franchisors as “confederations” of semi-
autonomous franchisees who experiment locally to solve problems that are then shared with 
others through franchisee councils and/or the franchisor’s intranet. However, because such 
sharing is voluntary (Darr et al., 1995), franchisors typically bear responsibility for refining 
the franchisee’s business model, either through investments in new knowledge – e.g., new 
product development, brand building, IT systems – or through the discovery, evaluation, and 
codification of knowledge from franchisees (Bradach, 1997; Kaufmann & Eroglu, 1999). The 
franchisor also needs to manage vertical knowledge flows through communication (e.g., 
training programs) and by monitoring on-going implementation of operating procedures 
(Kidwell et al., 2007). In short, while both horizontal and vertical knowledge flows are 
important, franchising research tends to emphasize vertical knowledge flows.  
Rather than learning about, evaluating, and promoting best practices top-down, the 
evidence from Impact Hub suggests that social franchisors benefit from greater focus on 
horizontal knowledge – by encouraging and facilitating collaborative knowledge sharing 
across geographically dispersed franchisees (cf., ‘open-system orchestration’ in Giudici, 
Reinmoeller, & Ravasi, 2017). The shared mission-driven identity provides franchisees with a 
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stronger motivation to share and collaborate than what is found among more commercially-
oriented franchisors. In the new structure, the franchisor serves as a repository for best 
practices, but its main goals became (1) to make sure that local hubs have all the necessary 
resources to innovate locally, (2) to connect the hubs so that franchisees could learn from each 
other, and (3) to foster collaborative engagement among franchisees and members. 
Accordingly, we submit the following proposition that formalizes this peculiar franchisor role:  
Proposition 2c: The more important the social mission, the more a shared mission 
driven-identity shifts a social franchisor’s role toward the orchestration of 
collaborative knowledge sharing among franchisees (i.e., horizontal learning) and 
away from centrally codifying and teaching franchisees (i.e., vertical learning).  
 
DISCUSSION 
Although social entrepreneurs have increasingly turned to franchising to scale social 
value, theoretical and empirical advances have been limited. Tracey and Jarvis’s (2007) 
observed that the social mission creates a destabilizing source of conflict in social franchising, 
but there has been little understanding of how social franchisors successfully overcome this 
challenge. To illuminate this issue, we conducted a field study of how Impact Hub – one of 
the largest social franchises by geographic reach – successfully innovated its business model 
and navigated the challenges identified by Tracey and Jarvis (2007). 
Theoretical Contributions 
We contribute to social entrepreneurship research in two main ways. First, we provide 
theoretical elaboration and empirical substantiation to the idea that the social mission can be a 
source of business model innovation and not just a source of conflict and tension. Although 
the distinction between social and commercial entrepreneurship can be conceptualized along a 
continuum with several shades of gray between purely social and purely commercial (Austin 
et al., 2006), prior work often treats the social mission as fundamentally at odds with the 
commercial mission and extensively highlights the trade-offs that socially-oriented 
organizations face when balancing diverging goals (Dacin et al., 2011; see Doherty, Haugh, & 
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Lyon, 2014, for a review). Wry and York (2017), however, questioned this long-held view 
and theorized that the social mission can be a source of innovation with respect to social 
organizations’ business models. Our study substantiates and expands upon their theorizing in 
the franchising context. Not only did the attractive vision become the glue that held 
stakeholders together during turbulent times (Proposition 1a), the resulting shared mission-
driven identity motivated them to find solutions (Proposition 1b), and the solutions they found 
leverage the mission-focused motivation that comes from a shared identity (Proposition 1c). 
The idea that shared values and norms can substitute for behavioral monitoring and/or output 
controls is not new (Ouchi, 1980; Mintzberg, 1989), but despite the importance of the social 
mission in social entrepreneu ship (e.g., Austin et al., 2006), its role in business model design 
was yet to be elaborated in the social franchising context. 
Our second contribution to social entrepreneurship research is to explain how 
franchising can be used to successfully scale social value. Prior research offers rich insights 
into the resources and capabilities (e.g., Liu, Eng, & Takeda, 2013) and alternative strategic 
approaches (e.g., Di Domenico, et al., 2010) that foster growth among social organizations. 
Yet, we know little about the organizational models that support scaling social value (cf., 
Cannatelli, Smith, Giudici, Jones, & Conger, 2017; Smith et al., 2014). We take a step in this 
direction by theorizing and illustrating how the shared mission-driven identity encouraged (1) 
decentralized decision-making, (2) shared governance and (3) a shift in the franchisor’s 
leadership role away from vertical knowledge transfer toward the orchestration of 
collaborative knowledge-sharing. All of these features can be found to some extent among 
commercially-oriented franchisors (e.g., Lawrence & Kaufmann, 2011; Meeks et al., 2011), 
but our evidence suggests that the shared mission-driven identity is an additional force that 
pushes franchisors’ business models, all else equal, further along these dimensions. Social 
franchisors are freer to take an additional step in these directions because franchisees can (and 
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expect) to be trusted to carry out the organization’s mission without overt supervision and, as 
Tracey and Jarvis (2007) demonstrated, economic incentives are not particularly helpful in 
this context.  
Our theoretical contributions and insights are grounded in a single case study of a 
social organization, Impact Hub, that provides business incubation and co-working spaces and 
services. While we are unable to establish external validity and rule out the possibility that 
incubators present somewhat idiosyncratic characteristics that do not apply to other social 
organizations, this limitation is attenuated by the potential for analytical generalizability (Yin, 
2013). In line with best-practice approaches to analytical generalizability (see Cardador & 
Pratt, 2017 for a recent example), our work provides an important starting point for theory 
development in an area – social franchising – that is still emerging. In addition, the kind of 
organization that we investigated – a network of business incubators and co-working spaces – 
is far from contextually unique but one among many organizations engaging in what recent 
work calls ‘open-system orchestration’ (Giudici et al., 2017) that involves leading and 
supporting innovation and collaborative knowledge sharing among geographically dispersed 
actors. Open-system orchestrators include business incubators and other ‘pro-social’ 
organizations such as venture associations and government agencies (Giudici et al., 2017). 
Although it is ultimately an empirical question, we believe that our findings about the role of 
the social mission in fostering business model adaptations could be transferred to many such 
organizations. There are also several global non-profit organizations engaged in social 
entrepreneurship – such as Action Aid, E4Impact, the School for Social Entrepreneurs, the 
Trussell Trust – that have adopted social franchise business models similar to Impact Hub, 
reinforcing the notion that our theoretical insights have potential to be transferred to similar 
organizations in similar contexts (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  
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Overall, our contributions regarding (1) the social mission as a source of franchise 
business model innovation, and (2) the adaptations that leverage the shared mission-driven 
identity appear to have analytical generalizability, and thus have implications for both social 
entrepreneurship and commercial franchising research.  
Implications for Future Research 
Implications for Social Entrepreneurship Research. Our study provides evidence in 
one context supporting recent theory that tensions between commercial and social goals can 
be harnessed to better achieve both (e.g., Battilana et al., 2015). Recent evidence, however, 
highlights that there are important contingencies that impact the ability of social entrepreneurs 
to manage tensions between social and commercial goals; social impact appears easier with 
less intractable problems, supportive institutional contexts, and skilled management (Wry & 
Zhao, 2017). Recent theory also suggests that different social entrepreneurs identify 
differently with their social and commercial missions (Wry & York, 2017). Taken together 
with our findings, future research might benefit from investigating how specific business 
model adaptations and their effectiveness with respect to social and commercial missions vary 
across both institutional contexts (Wry & Zhao, 2017) and social actor’s identity (Wry & 
York, 2017). For example, Santos et al. (2015) suggested that the risk of (social) mission drift 
is higher and financial sustainability more difficult in contexts where beneficiaries are 
different from the social organization’s clients. Thus, future research might compare the 
business model adaptations that we identified (where the ultimate beneficiaries are clients of 
the franchisees) with those identified by Kistruck et al., (2011) in micro-franchising (where 
the franchisees are the beneficiaries). It seems likely that one important distinction is that the 
mission-driven identity is shared by both the franchisor and franchisees in social franchises 
like the kind we studied but might only be held by the franchisor in micro-franchising. Thus, 
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adaptations such as shared governance that helped Impact Hub thrive might be less likely in 
the base of the pyramid context where micro-franchising often occurs (Kistruck et al., 2011).  
A second implication our study offers for social entrepreneurship research is the need 
to consider ‘socialficing’: “the purposeful pursuit of social objectives at the expense of 
financial efficiency” (Kistruck, Beamish, Qureshi, & Sutter, 2013: 60). This notion was 
developed as an analog to Simon’s (1957) concept of ‘satisficing’ to recognize less-than-
optimal outcomes created by trade-offs between financial and social goals. In our study, 
franchisees who were not benefitting from Impact Hub’s business model invested their time 
and money into the franchise because of their shared mission-driven identity, effectively 
trading-off financial efficiency to preserve social value. The existence of socialficing behavior 
among social franchisees in our case generates salient questions such as: Is socialficing a 
trade-off judgment that social entrepreneurs make a priori or a rationalization after 
underperformance in either the social or financial realm? Is there a minimum threshold for 
financial stability that could be acceptable for social franchisees, and social entrepreneurs 
more broadly? How does socialficing behavior vary across types of entrepreneurs and social 
organizations and environments?  
Another future research implication is that our results point to the need to investigate 
how the embeddedness of social ties shape the scaling of social value. Prior research theorized 
that the degree of embeddedness is inversely related to the potential scale of geographic 
growth and positively related to more autonomy among key actors (Smith & Stevens, 2010). 
The case of Impact Hub seems to confirm the latter prediction because its business model 
shifted toward more decentralized (autonomous) decision-making. Diverting from the former 
prediction, however, strong embedded social ties remained even as the organization continued 
to grow. Our case data implies that growth despite embedded ties occurred with the support of 
a strong social identity, and a change in the franchisor’s role from one of vertical knowledge 
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distributor to horizontal knowledge orchestrator – highlighting the need for social 
entrepreneurs’ roles to change as the enterprise evolves (Cannatelli, et al., 2017; Santos, 
2012). Accordingly, we believe that a deeper appreciation of how social embeddedness 
enables or constraints the scaling of social value is a promising avenue for future research.  
Implications for Future Franchising Research. By explaining ways that a strong 
shared mission-driven identity influenced the direction of a social franchisor’s business 
model, our contributions are primarily to social entrepreneurship research. However, our 
findings also raise questions for research on more commercially-oriented franchisors. An 
emerging “symbiosis perspective” describes the balance between chain-wide standardization 
and local market adaptation as a central challenge for franchisors (Perryman & Combs, 2012); 
company-owned outlets are viewed as keepers of standardization and franchisees are the 
source of innovation and adaptation. Although the symbiosis perspective suggests that 
franchisors benefit from learning about franchisees’ local innovations, most emphasis remains 
on enforcing standardization (Ater & Rigbi, 2015) and franchisors appear slow to learn about 
franchisee innovations (Darr et al., 1995). Our observation that Impact Hub transitioned 
successfully into an orchestrator of collaboration among franchisees leads us to wonder if 
some commercial franchisors might develop better “orchestration capabilities” (cf. Dhanaraj 
& Parkhe 2006) than others with respect to their franchisees and raises questions for future 
research about what organizational structures might facilitate this. Existing evidence suggests 
that franchisors differ in the quality of communication with franchisees and that such 
communication can improve outcomes (e.g., Meeks et al., 2011), but little is known about 
how franchisors develop communication capabilities and whether these are part of a larger set 
of capabilities for working with franchisees. Do such franchisors send more people to and 
openly engage with franchisees at their annual meeting? Do they incentivize the “consultants” 
who work with franchisees to bring back franchisee adaptations for further testing (or do they 
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reward consultants for keeping franchisees from innovating)? Do they have personnel 
dedicated to learning about and testing franchisee innovations? 
Although much research focuses on the role of standardization (e.g., Ater & Rigbi, 
2015; Bradach, 1997), commercial franchise business models vary considerably, especially in 
terms of the extent to which franchisees have autonomy to adapt products and services to the 
local market (Castrogiovanni & Justis, 1998; Kaufmann & Eraglu, 1999). However, the 
theoretical rationale for such variance is usually economic – e.g., because local offerings are 
complex, customized, or require modifications to meet local demands (Castrogiovanni & 
Justis, 1998; Mumdžiev and Windsperger, 2011; Kaufmann & Eraglu, 1999). Our study 
suggests that Impact Hub’s franchise model shared characteristics with the decentralized 
‘confederation form’ described by Castrogiovanni and Justis (1998) but also that the social 
mission generates additional pressure that pushes social franchising a step further, closer to 
Mintzberg’s (1979) ‘missionary organization’, which is held together by members’ shared 
identity and values. Prior research suggests that franchisees in a commercial context can have 
a shared identity (Lawrence & Kaufmann, 2011) and that perceived trust (Chiou et al., 2004) 
and cohesion (El Akremi et al., 2010) yield better outcomes, but the possibility that relational 
factors such as a shared identity among franchisees might also, as in the missionary 
organization, move the business model further toward decentralization, greater franchisee 
voice, or change the franchisor’s leadership role, has not been considered and seems worthy 
of future inquiry. It might also be fruitful to ask these questions of other geographically 
dispersed network organizations, such as retailers’ or producers’ cooperatives, that share 
features with franchising but use different contracts and/or fee structures.  
Implications for social entrepreneurs 
Our findings offer practical guidance for social organizations seeking to scale social 
value via franchising. First, given the importance of shared mission-driven identity, our study 
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implies that social franchisors will gain from investing time and attention assessing potential 
franchisees’ commitment to the social mission during franchisee recruitment and selection. 
This is important because monetary incentives lack motivational force (Krzeminska & Zeyen, 
2017), leaving the shared mission as the primary source of franchisee motivation. In our 
study, Impact Hub accomplished this in part by requiring prospective franchisees to acquire 
two referrals from existing hubs. Second, because the shared-mission driven identity is the 
primary hedge against free-riding, results imply that social franchisors might benefit from 
shifting resources away from monitoring toward activities that reinforce the shared identity, 
such as ongoing councils and frequent conferences. Impact Hub orchestrated regular global 
franchisee gatherings – like the one we attended in 2015 - and used task forces with members 
from several hubs to manage specific franchisee management and growth processes. Indeed, 
such a resource shift might also benefit commercial franchisors as a means of lowering 
agency costs – at least among those where franchisees identify strongly with the brand.  
CONCLUSION 
Although many social entrepreneurs have turned toward franchising as a way to scale 
social value, theory development for explaining how the franchise business model might be 
adapted to the social context has lagged behind. Tracey and Jarvis (2007) showed that social 
franchising is indeed distinct from more commercially-oriented franchising, and that the 
social mission creates challenges regarding how to balance social and financial goals. Our 
detailed investigation of a social franchisor that overcame these challenges showed that the 
social mission can be a powerful source of business model innovation and that franchisees’ 
devotion to a shared mission-driven identity is central. It not only motivated stakeholders to 
find adaptive solutions within the franchise model, the solutions they identified leverage the 
motivation that shared identities bring. Our hope is that these insights spark fruitful future 
inquiry for both social entrepreneurship and franchising research.  
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TABLE 1  
KNOWN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COMMERCIAL  
AND SOCIAL FRANCHISING 
 
 Commercial franchising Social franchising  
Strategic Goal (Primarily) value appropriation and 
aligning incentives between franchisor and 
franchisees 
(Primarily) Value creation with dual 
commercial and social goals 
 
Motivation for 
Franchising 
Franchisors’ gain access to franchisees’ 
capital and labor with low selection and 
monitoring costs. Franchisees seek high 
returns relative to risks. 
Franchisors share their solution to a social 
problem. Franchisees may become part of 
a larger movement and solve a social 
problem locally. 
Sources of 
Conflict  
Franchisors might not offer adequate 
support service or brand building; 
franchisees might fail to maintain quality 
(i.e., free ride) 
Overemphasis by either party of the social 
mission at the expenses of economic 
sustainability, or vice versa.  
Key reference Combs, Ketchen, Shook, & Short (2011) Tracey & Jarvis (2007) 
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TABLE 2 
DATA USE AND SOURCES 
 
Data sources Type of data Use in the analysis 
Direct 
observation 
Attendance to local events and meetings 
(2011-2015) 
Participation to 11 events and workshops 
open to hub members at Impact Hub Milan 
(6) and London King Cross (6). 
 
 
Field visits (2011-2016) 
5 educational visits to Impact Hub Milan 
with university students. 
  
Regular clinics with members at Impact 
Hubs in London. 
 
Visit at Impact Hub Accra.  
 
 
Attendance to the Impact Hub’s global 
gathering Unlikely Allies (June 2015) 
Non-participant observation during two 
days (open to hub founders and staff 
members only) dedicated to the assessment 
of the 10 years of the network and the 
discussion of its future evolution.  
 
 
 
Acquiring familiarity with the Impact Hub 
environment. 
Understanding the mission and modus operandi 
of Impact Hub. 
 
 
Gaining insights about Impact Hub external 
communication, organizational image and 
identity. 
Gaining insights on members’ activities and 
interaction 
 
Gaining insights about local adaptation in a 
recently established hub.  
 
 
 
Gaining knowledge about governance related 
issues; triangulation of data collected from 
other sources; member validation.  
Interviews Semi-structured interviews - first round 
(2011) 
17 interviews with Impact Hub founders 
and managers.  
 
 
 
 
Semi-structured interviews - second 
round (2014-2015) 
5 interviews with Impact Hub founders 
and managers.  
 
 
 
Semi-structured interviews - third 
round (2015) 
4 interviews with members of the global 
management team of Impact Hub. 
 
 
Confirmatory interviews - fourth round 
(2017-2018) 
4 interviews with two members of the 
global management team of Impact Hub 
plus 3 interviews with senior management 
of social organizations with comparable 
franchising business model. 
 
 
 
Building, integrating, validating the event 
history database. 
Gaining insights about decision-making within 
the franchise while the governance structure 
was still in flux.  
 
 
 
Gaining further insights about decision-making 
within the franchise after its governance 
structure reached stability and matured. 
 
 
 
 
Triangulating facts and observation; exploring 
expected changes in the franchise’s governance 
structure and their rationale.  
 
 
 
Confirming final data interpretation and 
theorization; strengthening the potential for 
analytic generalizability and transferability of 
findings.  
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TABLE 3 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOCIAL MISSION FOR FRANCHISE BUSINESS MODELS  
 
 More Commercially-oriented franchises More Socially-oriented franchise  
Franchising 
Business Model 
(P1a-c) 
Must reliably deliver economic returns that 
attract and keep franchisees. Franchisees 
pay fees and royalty in exchange for 
replication rights and central support 
services. Economic profit is central 
motivation but social identity matters too. 
Must reliably solve a social problem that 
attracts franchisees while generating self-
sustaining economic returns. Franchisees 
pay fees and royalties in exchange for 
replication rights and central support 
services. Social mission-driven identity is 
central motivation, but economic stability 
matters too. 
Decision 
Making (P2a) 
Centralized when standardized experience 
around a common brand is important, but 
decentralized for those decisions that 
require local adaptation (e.g., pricing) and 
when franchisees’ tasks are difficult to 
standardize and/or customers do not expect 
it.  
Mostly decentralized to franchisees who 
can be trusted because of a shared identity; 
certain functions (e.g., support services) 
are centralized but franchisees can 
implement flexibly. Franchisor actively 
promotes and protects (e.g., through 
selection) shared mission-driven identity. 
Governance  
(P2b) 
Franchisor owns and runs the franchise. 
Franchisees may progressively gain voice 
through social relationships and via 
franchisee councils/associations.   
Shared governance with frequent input 
from franchisees is desirable and possible 
because it aligns with the social mission. 
At the extreme, the shared mission makes 
shared ownership possible. 
Role of the 
Franchisor  
(P2c) 
Franchisor teaches franchisees about the 
business model (i.e., vertical learning) and 
monitors implementation. Changes to the 
business model sometimes starts with 
franchisees but are vetted by the franchisor 
before widespread distribution. 
Franchisor orchestrates knowledge sharing 
among franchisees (i.e., horizontal 
learning) and supports innovation. 
Franchisee innovations are shared widely 
and individual franchisees decide which 
innovations to implement. 
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FIGURE 1. CODING STRUCTURE 
 
 
  
• Encouraging knowledge sharing among 
franchisees
• Facilitating bottom-up innovation
• Following the mission as the authority
• Sharing common values such as trust and 
collaboration
• Demanding more democratic and fairer 
management of the network
• Feeling part of a translocal community
First order 
categories
Second order 
themes
Aggregate 
dimensions
SOCIAL MISSION 
AS A SOURCE OF 
FRANCHISE MODEL 
INNOVATION
• Offering the opportunity to be part of a global 
network of ‘impact-makers’
• Inspiring others to join
Attractive vision 
for social change
• Not receiving adequate decision-making, 
operational, and innovation support
• Finding the financial arrangement too hefty
Struggle with the 
franchisor’s model
F
ra
n
ch
is
o
r’
s 
si
d
e
(t
ra
d
it
io
n
a
l)
MISSION-DRIVEN 
IDENTITY 
ADAPTATIONS TO 
FRANCHISE MODEL
Mission-driven 
identity as 
innovation guide
Decentralized 
Decision-Making
Orchestrator of 
Collaborative 
Knowledge Sharing
F
ra
n
ch
is
ee
s’
 s
id
e
F
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n
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o
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s 
si
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(i
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ed
)
• Shifting towards distributed and equal 
ownership
• Creating an inverted power structure
Shared 
Governance
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FIGURE 2. IMPACT HUB MILESTONE 
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